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Rosenblatt v. Exxon:
PREVIOUS TENANT
OF COMMERCIAL
PROPERTY
NOT LIABLE TO
SUBSEQUENT
OCCUPIERS FOR
CONTAMINATION
OF THE LAND.

The Court of Appeals
of Maryland precluded an occupier of commercial land from
recovering damages from a prior occupier for alleged contamination of the property by toxic
chemicals under strict liability,
negligence, trespass, and nuisance causes of action.
Rosenblatt v. Exxon, 335 Md.
58,642 A.2d 180 (1994). In so
ruling, the court insulated previous occupiers of land from
liability for the damage they inflict to the land by severely limiting subsequent occupiers'
methods of recovery.
Thomas Rosenblatt
leased a parcel of real property
with plans to open an automotive quick lubrication business
on the premises. Prior to
Rosenblatt's occupancy, the
Exxon company had leased the
land for thirty-four years for use
as a gasoline station. Before
building his business, Rosenblatt
had an environmental test administered which detected extensive petroleum contamination in both the soil and groundwater. Accordingly, the Maryland Department of the Environment was notified. Upon
conducting its own investigation the Department informed
Exxon that it had violated Maryland law, at which time Exxon
commenced a remediation of
the property. As a result of the
condition of the property,
Rosenblatt lost financing for his
business and was unable to commence construction.
Rosenblatt filed suit
against Exxon in the Circuit
Court for Prince George's

County, alleging counts ofstrict
liability, negligence, trespass,
and private nuisance. The complaint sought economic damages, including expenses resulting
from the contamination and lost
future profits. Exxon removed
the suit to the United States
District Court for the District of
Maryland, which granted Exxon
partial summary judgment on
grounds not here at issue. The
court remanded the remaining
counts to the circuit court. The
trial court granted Exxon's
motion for summary judgment,
stating that Maryland law did
not provide protection to tenants of commercial property
against previous tenants of the
same land under the causes of
action Rosenblatt set forth.
Rosenblatt appealed to the court
of special appeals, at which time
the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari prior to
review by the intermediate appellate court.
The court of appeals
began its analysis by rejecting
Rosenblatt's argument that the
strict liability doctrine should be
extended to claims of subsequent occupiers. Maryland
adopted section 519 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(1965), which requires that there
be harm to a person or property
of another resulting from an
abnormally dangerous activity.
Rosenblatt, 335 Md. 58,69-70,
642 A.2d 180, 185. Since its
adoption, however, the court
has protected strict liability from
judicial expansion. Specifically, the court has declined to
extend the doctrine in situations
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where the alleged tortfeasorwas
not the owner or occupier of
land. Id. at 71,642 A.2d at 186
(citing Toy v. Atlantic Gulf &
Pacific Co., 176 Md. 197,213,
4 A.2d 757 (1939)). Similarly,
the doctrine has been limited to
apply only where the abnormally dangerous activity "is carried on by a contemporaneous
occupier of neighboring land."
Id at 72,642 A.2d at 186 (citing
Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 304
Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143
(1985)).
After reviewing these
limitations, the court reasoned
that requiring the plaintiff to be
a neighboring landowner was
an essential tenet of the doctrine which should remain intact. In so doing, the court
noted extension of the doctrine
would be inconsistent with the
Restatement, which requires
harm to property of another,
where here the harm was to the
owner's own land. Rosenblatt,
335 Md. at 75,642 A.2d at 188.
Furthermore, the court stated
that a subsequent occupier of
the same property is able to
avoid harm completely by adequately inspecting the property
prior to purchasing or leasing it.
Id at 74, 642 A.2d at 188. The
court also noted that the common law rule of caveat emptor
still applies in Maryland to the
sale ofcommercial property. Id
at 75 n.7, 642 A.2d at 188 n.7.
Additionally, Rosenblatt's
complaint claimed only economic losses. The principles ofstrict
liability, in contrast, afford protection only to injuries to the
person or property, "notto eco-

nomic losses resulting from
failed business opportunities."
Id at 75, 642 A.2d at 188.
Therefore, the court refused to
expand the doctrine of strict
liability to reach a claim for economic loss by a subsequent occupier of commercial property
against a prior tenant.
Next, the court examined Rosenblatt's negligence
claim against Exxon. In denying Rosenblatt's claim, the court
noted that an occupier of land
owes certain duties to both those
who come onto the land, as well
as occupants ofneighboring land
so as to avoid causing harm to
the neighboring land. In contrast, however, an occupant of
land owes no duty of care to
avoid harm to his own land that
may cause injury to a future
occupant of the same land. Id
at76-77,642A.2dat 189. The
court explained that inherent in
the concept ofduty is the necessity that a relationship exist between the parties, out of which
the duty arises. Id. at 77, 642
A.2d at 189. In determining
that no relationship existed, the
court reasoned that it was not
foreseeable that "an act or failure to act by Exxon would result in harm to Rosenblatt." Id
Fwthermore, asRosenblatt
was aware that the property had
previously been used as a gasoline station, he knew, or at least
should have known, that petroleum contamination was possible.Id at 78,642 A.2d at 189.
As such, Rosenblatt was in the
position to have his lease be
conditioned on a satisfactory
completion ofan environmental

survey ofthe property. Failure
to reasonably inspect the land
and/or require contractual terms
shifting the burden of risk to
Exxon did not, in the court's
view, impose a duty upon Exxon
to avoid injury to subsequent
occupiers ofland. Id Thus, the
court affirmed summary judgment on the negligence claim
against Exxon.
In turning to the next
claim, the court refused to extend the tort of trespass to circumstances where the intruding
object entered thepremisesduring the trespasser's occupancy.
Id Implicit in the definition of
a continuing trespass is that "the
affected land is land of another." Id at 78,642 A.2d at 190
(emphasis added). Accordingly, the contamination could not
be considered a tortious placing
because it did not occur while
Rosenblatt was the occupant.
This analysis, coupled with the
lack of any authority to support
Rosenblatt's contention, led the
court to reject the argument that
petroleum contamination constituted a continuing trespass
for which a subsequent occupant could recover against a
previous occupant.
Lastly, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland rejected
Rosenblatt's contention that the
law provides an action in nuisance to a subsequent occupant
ofland against a previous occupant. Examining section 821 D
of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts (1965), which provides
that a private nuisance is a
"nontrespassory invasion ofanother's interest in the private
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use and enjoyment ofland," the
court concluded that a private
nuisance only occurs when a
wrong is done to a neighboring
owner, not a subsequent occupier of the same property.
Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 80, 642
A2dat 190 (citingMeadowbrook
Swimming Club v. Albert, 173
Md. 641, 645, 197 A.2d 146
(1938». In addition, the court
noted that other jurisdictions
which have considered the issue
have maintained the requirement
that the land in question be that
of a neighbor's. Rosenblatt,
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335 Md. at,80, 642 A.2dat 190.
As such, the court affirmed
Exxon's summary judgment on
the nuisance issue as well.
As a result of Thomas
Rosenblatt being a neighbor in
time with the Exxon company,
rather than a neighbor in space,
the law offered him no redress
for the petroleum contamination of his property. In
Rosenblatt v. Exxon, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland denied
an occupier of commercial land
any recompense under strict liability, negligence, trespass, or

nuisance causes of actions. In
so ruling, the court effectively
absolves previous occupiers of
land of liability for the damage
they inflict to the land during
their occupancy. Nonetheless,
environmental catastrophes often go undetected for extended
periods oftime. Rosenblatt signifies the increasing probability
over time that a subsequent occupier will bear the economic
burden of another's neglect.
- Garret P. Glennon Jr.

